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Abstract
Statistical Analysis of Identity Risk of Exposure and
Cost Using the Ecosystem of Identity Attributes
Chia-Ju Chen, M.S.E.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019
Supervisor: K. Suzanne Barber
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is often called the “currency
of the Internet” as identity assets are collected, shared, sold, and used for al-
most every transaction on the Internet. PII is used for all types of applications
from access control to credit score calculations to targeted advertising. Every
market sector relies on PII to know and authenticate their customers and their
employees. With so many businesses and government agencies relying on PII
to make important decisions and so many people being asked to share per-
sonal data, it is critical to better understand the fundamentals of identity to
protect it and responsibly use it. Previously developed comprehensive Iden-
tity Ecosystem utilizes graphs to model PII assets and their relationships and
is powered by empirical data from almost 6,000 real-world identity theft and
v
fraud news reports to populate the UT CID Identity Ecosystem. We analyze
UT CID Identity Ecosystem using graph theory and report numerous novel
statistics using identity asset content, structure, value, accessibility, and im-
pact. Our work sheds light on how identity is used and paves the way for
improving identity protection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Personally identifiable information (PII) is any data that could poten-
tially be used to recognize a particular person, and it is commonly used in
both physical and cyber spaces to perform personal authentication. Identity
theft is the fraudulent acquisition and usage without permission of a person’s
PII. A modern authentication process usually requires collection of PII and
increases the risk of exposure to identity theft and fraud criminals.
In 2017, the number of identity fraud victims increased by 8% rising to
16.7 million U.S. consumers. Fraudsters stole from 1.3 million more victims
in 2017 stealing a total of $16.8 billion from U.S. consumers [16]. More intel-
ligent and comprehensive approaches should be provided to thwart the crime
of identity theft.
In order to model the identity ecosystem, an intuitive approach is to
analyze the components from both cyber and physical aspects. Modern society
seamlessly merges online and oﬄine PII attributes. Examples of on-line at-
tributes are one’s social media accounts, on-line shopping patterns, passwords,
and email accounts. Off-line attributes are those related to the physical world
such as bank accounts, credit and debit cards, Social Security Number, and
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one’s physical characteristics.
The UT CID Identity Ecosystem developed at the Center for Iden-
tity (CID) at the University of Texas (UT) at Austin constructed a graph-
based model of people, devices, and organizations [25]. It models the relation
between PII as a Bayesian Network, and performs interference for possible
sources of breaches and cost if the source is compromised. It provides a frame-
work for understanding the value, risk and mutual relationships for pairs of
PII attributes. Each vertex represents an attribute whereas edges in-between
imply the relationship.
For data source of ecosystem, The Identity Threat Assessment and
Prediction (ITAP) [27] project is leveraged. ITAP is developed to focus on
gathering identity theft information from news stories, structuring this infor-
mation, analyzing it, and discovering trends and characteristics.
We obtained UT CID Identity Ecosystem and the ITAP collection as
the data source. Based on this graph-based network of identity, we have de-
signed and implemented a visualization framework that facilitates understand-
ing of the whole risk network rather than reviewing unstructured raw news feed
data from ITAP. We introduce three main statistical evaluation criteria: (1)
Traditional pie, bar, and scatter plots of vertex or edge specific values are
employed to show the distribution. (2) Centrality measures such as degree,
closeness, and betweenness centrality are utilized and hence illustrate each PII
with certain structural features. (3) Strongly Connected Components (SCC)
are applied to distinguish groups of PII that are interconnected. With these
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criteria, our visualization framework can prototype the identity system with
detailed features such as PII that are most efficient to spread the information
if breached, or PII that are aggregated as a group that will easily be traversed
if one member is already compromised. The main contribution of this thesis
includes the application of sophisticated graph theoretical concepts to reveal
unprecedented insights into PII and the relationship between PII attributes.
The remainder of this article is structured as follow. Chapter II elabo-
rates on the importance of statistical analysis of the Ecosystem tool and the
set of measurements to be included. Chapter III presents a comprehensive
evaluation and takeaways from the results. Chapter IV includes the related
work of the identity ecosystem, identity theft, and related government reports.
Chapter V concludes the research and gives insights for future work.
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Chapter 2
Statistics Based on Ecosystem
Identity is the new currency. Today, it is virtually impossible to buy
anything, access government services, enter an airport, a place of work, an
amusement park or a computer network without providing identity informa-
tion. Identity information is valuable to the individual, to corporations, to
government agencies but unfortunately to criminals as well. Privacy and se-
curity are vital to protect these valuable identity assets. To protect an asset
we must know that asset. To protect identity information currency assets, we
must know the complete inventory of those assets.
Leveraging the empirical ITAP data, the UT CID Identity Ecosystem
project is building the canonical inventory describing different types of identity
assets, the valuation of those assets and the connectedness of those assets that
produces a type physics in the Identity Ecosystem. Identity assets cannot be
treated as a simple “list of data” but must be managed as a complex and
dependent network of assets with different entry points, vulnerabilities and
ever-changing values and risk. A deeper understanding of this network of
identity assets will result in a better understanding of how to protect, use,
and monetize (for the legitimate reasons) these identity assets.
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The Identity Ecosystem is a valuable previously implemented tool that
models identity liaison, analyzes identity fraud and breaches, and answers sev-
eral questions about identity risk management [25]. It maps identity attributes
in a probabilistic model and performs Bayesian network-based inference to de-
termine the posterior effects on each attribute. The Identity Ecosystem models
individual identity attributes as nodes whereas edges in-between indicate var-
ious types of connections.
Each vertex includes different properties such as type of node, risk of
exposure, and intrinsic monetary value. The Ecosystem Graphical User Inter-
face (GUI) can color and size nodes based on their properties independently.
Figure 2.1 shows an example snapshot in which the nodes are colored based
on their risk of exposure and are sized based on their liability value.
Figure 2.1: Background: A snapshot showing previously developed UT CID
Ecosystem attribute graph.
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The Identity Ecosystem takes ITAP’s output as its input. Identity
Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) is a risk assessment framework
that characterize the of process for identity theft and patterns of vulnera-
bilities [26]. ITAP captures instances of identity crime from diverse sources,
further aggregates this data to portrait the identity vulnerabilities, the value
of identity attributes, and their risk of exposure.
Continually collecting raw text data from various sources of news feeds
stories, ITAP aims to determine the approaches and resources actually used
to carry out identity crimes; the vulnerabilities that were exploited during
the process; as well as the consequences according to these incidents for the
individual victims, the organizations affected and the perpetrators involved.
The ITAP database is a comprehensive, structured, and continually growing
repository of such information, with approximately 6,000 incidents captured
so far. The cases span from 2000 to 2018.
The research questions we seek to answer in this thesis are that “Given a
network of identity, what are the underlying characteristics? Among the large
amount of PII, what are the ones that are most likely sources for breaches?”.
As in the real-world, an individual might hold a variety of PII, ranging from
banking information to electronic device logs to personal attributes. Some of
those PII attributes are more important to protect since they are more likely
to expose one’s identity. For example, intuitively, a Social Security Number
(SSN) or passport number are considered to be more critical PII since they
map directly to an individual, and can be breached with high probability.
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Another question we aim to answer is “If a certain PII is compromised, what
is the cost for the fraudster to acquire all the other accessible PII?”. For a
real-world analogy, if the name and email address of a person are exposed,
what is the cost for the identity thieves to collect an individual’s credit card
information or SSN record? Furthermore, (1) how efficient is it to acquire all
the rest of the PII network? and (2) how likely is it for identity thieves to
possess certain PII? According to these measures, we observe on “Given the
PII that spread the information flow most quickly or serve as the gateway for
breaches, can we capture the source and circumvent jeopardizing the whole
network?”. Lastly, “can we know the topology of the identity network? How
is it interconnected or how is every PII located in the Ecosystem?”.
We then map the questions into graph based model as ”In a graph-based
network of identity, what are the isolated PII nodes and connected ones? If
formed as an interconnected cluster, what are the ones on boundary and on
center?”. We would also want to answer ”Inside the network, which PII is in
the critical path of obtaining others most often and which PII can influence
the acquisition of the other PII?”.
In this thesis, we focus on three statistical indices on the given data
set: (1) Bar, pie, and distribution charts based on the node or edge value (2)
Centrality measurement including node specific in and out-degree centrality,
betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality and (3) Strongly connected
components of nodes for identifying clusters. Based on the results, a compre-
hensive discussion is presented about possible breaches with more important
7
attributes, and flow of personal information inside the network modeling the
real-world information movement.
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Chapter 3
Statistical Charts
We present sets of mathematical formula and statistical chart visual-
ization in this chapter. The data source we used is from ITAP in Ecosystem,
which contains 627 PII attributes in total, and divides the analyses based on
edge or node specific properties. We represent the Identity Ecosystem as a
graph G(V,E) consisting of N attributes A1, ...,AN and a set of directed edges
as tuples eij = 〈i, j〉 where Ai is the originating node and Aj is the target node
such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Each edge eij represents a possible path by which
Aj can be breached given that Ai is breached. Each node Aj is labeled with
a Boolean random variable, denoted D(Aj), which is true if the attribute has
been exposed and false otherwise. For simplicity, we consider all edges to be
independent. Therefore, we can assign conditional probabilities to each edge
with Prob(eij) = Prob(D(Aj)|D(Ai)).
3.0.1 Statistical charts based on edges
We implement the pie chart to observe the percentage for PII with/without
outgoing edges or with/without incoming edges as shown in Figure 3.1. We
can observe that 211 PII attributes (33%) are with incoming edges, while 45
(7%) are with outgoing edges.
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Insight: Only 7% of PII have any effect on the risk of exposure of
others and a total of 33% could possibly be affected. The PII with outgoing
edges should be carefully protected. The most important PII in this list are
discussed shortly.
Figure 3.1: A snapshot showing pie charts for percentage of nodes
with/without in/out degree.
Furthermore, taking the probability on the edges into account, we ex-
tend the degree centrality from summing discrete edge count to accumulating
risk. Degree centrality equals the number of links that a vertex has with other
vertices. The equation for this measure is as follows:
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CDout(vi) = outdegree(vi) = |{eij}| (3.1)
CDin(vi) = indegree(vi) = |{eji}| (3.2)
If we consider the weight (i.e., probability) on edges, this yields the
equation:
CWout(vi) = ΣProb(eij) (3.3)
CWin(vi) = ΣProb(eji) (3.4)
Figure 3.2 presents the top 10 PII in descending order based on the
number of incoming and outgoing edges. The top three attributes with the
highest number of incoming edges, i.e., most easily discoverable through in-
coming edges, are Name, Credit Card Information, and Date of Birth. Also,
the top three attributes with the highest number of outgoing edges, i.e., most
likely able to reach the wide variety of PII through outgoing edges, are Cus-
tomer Database, Password, and Email address. Figure 3.3 shows the same
statistics on the top 10 PII with most incoming and outgoing edges, with the
difference that it considers the sum of weights on the edges instead of merely
the edge count.
Insight: Name has the highest rank among PII discoverable from oth-
ers through incoming edges and Customer database sits at the top of nodes
with the highest outgoing degree, whether the edge count or edge weight is
considered.
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3.0.2 Statistical charts based on nodes
• Distribution Chart based on node risk and value
We examine the distribution based on risk and value of each attribute
to better understand the underlying trend for all properties. The chart is
calculated by fixing linear interval size on x-axis and counting the number of
PII lying in each interval. Figure 3.4 gives a snapshot of the distribution chart
for node value with interval unit of 100,000 in US Dollar value. According to
the ITAP project[27], ITAP determines the loss value of a PII by averaging
out the identity theft cases in which the PII was breached as a source of entry.
Since ITAP usually lacks the number of victims involved in a case, the loss
value is not per victim. Figure 3.5 yields a result for node risk with interval
size 0.001.
Insight: The vast majority of PII are valued at less than $100,000 but
have a risk of exposure of less than 0.001 too.
• Scatter plot of Closeness vs. Betweenness Centrality
Freeman [10] developed a set of measures for centrality based on be-
tweenness. Later on, he proposed four core criteria, which developed into
degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality [9]. We further
leverage the concept of closeness and betweenness centrality to investigate
the Ecosystem graph.
12
Figure 3.2: A snapshot showing top 10 PII with most in and out degree count.
Closeness Centrality emphasizes how close a vertex is to all other
vertices in the topology – the distance of a vertex to all others in the network
by focusing on the geodesic measurement from each vertex to all others [9]. To
be more specific, it calculates the shortest path between all nodes and assigns
each node a score based on the length of its shortest paths to other nodes.
According to Yin et al. [5], closeness is an evaluation for “how long it will take
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Figure 3.3: A snapshot showing top 10 PII with most in and out probability
sum on edges.
information to spread from a given vertex to others in the network” (p.1603),
which helps find the PII attributes that are best placed to reach others once
breached, and thus influence the entire network most efficiently. Consequently,
closeness centrality in the identity ecosystem is a measure of Information
Acquisition Power. The higher it is for a PII attribute, the more power
14
Figure 3.4: Distribution chart based on node value with interval size of
$100,000.
that PII attribute has in exploiting the entire identity ecosystem. Such PII
attribute would only need few others to discover the whole network. Also
according to Freidkin [11], closeness centrality represents the independence in
the sense that PII attributes with higher closeness centrality do not need to
seek information from other more peripheral PII attributes. This yields the
equation as follows. Cc(vi) stands for the closeness centrality for vertex i and
D(i, j) is the distance of the shortest paths between two vertices vi and vj
(considering the number of edges and not edge weight):
Cc(vi) =
n∑
j=1
1
D(i, j)
(3.5)
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Figure 3.5: Distribution chart based on node risk with interval size of 0.001.
Betweenness Centrality Betweenness centrality [9] serves as an alter-
native concept of centrality focusing on control over the connections between
other pairs of vertices. Betweenness centrality does this by identifying all the
shortest paths and then aggregating how many times the node lies on one.
Using α(i, j) as the number of different shortest 〈i, j〉 paths, and α(i, u, j) as
how many times the shortest path flows through u (u 6= i, j), the equation is
as follows:
CB(u) =
∑
i 6=j 6=u
α(i, u, j)
α(i, j)
(3.6)
Betweenness centrality recognizes nodes that act as ‘bridges’ among
whole and assesses the PII attributes that determine the flow around the sys-
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tem. Betweenness serves as a powerful characteristic for communication dy-
namics – a high betweenness index could imply a node regulates collaboration
in-between, holds authority over, or infers periphery of diverse clusters. In
our Ecosystem context, it measures how often a PII attribute is in the critical
path of acquiring or discovering other PII, and hence measures Criticality.
We calculate the scatter plot of Information Acquisition power (y-axis)
vs. Criticality (x-axis). This plot could further be divided into four quadrants
based on the combination of high and low values on x and y axes. Denoting
C for Criticality (i.e., betweenness) and I for Information Acquisition Power
(i.e., closeness), Figure 3.6 shows the graph with blue dots representing high
C and high I, Figure 3.7 with green dots low C and High I, Figure 3.8 with
red dots High C and low I, and lastly Figure 3.9 with orange dots low C and
low I1.
Insight: Most of the data points maintain low information acquisi-
tion power and low criticality (Figure 3.9). There exists only few sparsely
distributed data points, discussed in more details shortly, with both high criti-
cality and high information acquisition power (Figure 3.6). Such PII attributes
are powerful in acquiring other PII and act as critical bottlenecks in the net-
work of PII attributes. If evaluated using the Ecosystem model, these PII
attributes could be asserted as attributes that will rapidly jeopardize the re-
maining sub-network if already exposed, and boost the information flow of
1Low and high are indicating below and above average, respectively.
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exposure inside the system. Interestingly, there is only one data point with
high criticality but low information acquisition power (Figure 3.8) and that is
Signature.
Figure 3.6: Scatter plot with high betweenness (criticality) and high closeness
(information acquisition power).
Figure 3.10 displays the top 10 PII in descending order based on the
value of information acquisition power and criticality.
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Figure 3.7: Scatter plot with low betweenness (criticality) and high closeness
(information acquisition power).
Insight: The top three attributes with the highest value of information
acquisition power are Email Address, Name, and Address. The top three at-
tributes with the highest value of criticality are Customer Database, Password,
and Email Address.
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Figure 3.8: Scatter plot with high betweenness (criticality) and low closeness
(information acquisition power).
3.0.3 Strongly Connected Components
In the current Identity Ecosystem, a large portion (%65) of nodes is
completely isolated from the rest of the Ecosystem. Among those PII at-
tributes with connections, we further identify attributes that are mutually
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Figure 3.9: Scatter plot with low betweenness (criticality) and low closeness
(information acquisition power).
coupled among themselves, which we define as ‘clusters’. Clusters serve as
subsets that are dangerous sources for breaches, can quickly jeopardize other
members in the group and confine the flow inside sub-network.
We propose the cluster to be a Strongly Connected Component (SCC)
21
Figure 3.10: A snapshot showing top 10 PII with highest information acquisi-
tion power and criticality values.
in the graph theory. A SCC of a directed graph G = (V,E) is a maximal set of
vertices U ⊆ V such that for every pair of vertices u and v in U , both u 7→ v
and v 7→ u hold, where u 7→ v means there is a directed path from u to v.
Consequently, in a cluster, there is a probability that every PII attribute can
reveal every other PII and be revealed by every other PII. Tarjan’s classic serial
algorithm for detection of SCCs runs linearly with respect to the number of
22
Cluster of attributes, containing 36 vertices sorted in alphabetical order.
1. Address 2. AccountNumber
3. AccountInformation 4. Age
5. BankAccountInformation 6. BankAccountNumber
7. BiographicData 8. BirthCertificateInformation
9. CreditCardInformation 10. CreditCardNumber
11. CVVCode 12. CheckInformation
13. DateofBirth 14. DebitCardInformation
15. Driver’sLicenseNumber 16. Driver’sLicenseInformation
17. Date 18. EmployeeLoginCredentials
19. EmailAddress 20. EmployeeRecord
21. ExpirationDat 22. IDCardInformation
23. LoginCredentials 24. Name
25. Password 26. PersonalIdentifiableInformation
27. PhoneNumber 28. PersonalIdentificationNumber
29. PhysicalAddress 30. PassportInformation
31. Photograph-Person 32. PatientMedicalRecord
33. RoutingNumber 34. SocialSecurityNumber
35. Username 36. W-2FormInformation
Table 3.1: List of attributes in SCC.
edges and uses depth-first search. We apply Tarjan’s algorithm [19] to compute
the clusters. We found one cluster of 36 nodes which we display in Table 3.1.
Insight: Every PII in Table 3.1 has a probability of exposing every
other PII in that table.
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Chapter 4
Discussion of Results
In this chapter, we analyze the statistical results and give example take-
aways from the above charts. Considering ITAP model, it filters out edges with
very low probability aiming to eliminate noise. Overall the Ecosystem contains
627 vertices. We can observe that a large portion of the nodes is not connected
to any other node. In fact, 65% of the nodes are fully isolated without any
inbound or outbound connections. Only a small portion is considered to be
important when breached or compromised, and one should make an effort to
protect them. Among those with connections, we further observe the ranking
by degree centrality to speculate candidates with most in-degree versus most
out-degree, which could be interpreted as attributes that are most likely to get
compromised, versus attributes that tend to spread information.
We further discover possible layout and structural features for the Iden-
tity Ecosystem graph by computing the SCC of the network. We extracted
clusters, where each node is inter-reachable inside the sub-graph. Between
that 33% with incoming and 7% with outgoing edge PII nodes, an overlap of
36 (about 5%) vertices constitutes a big component.
We can assert our ecosystem model to be a sparse graph, where most
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attributes are unreachable. Only 5% congregate together and serves as a
central concern for our identity management.
We utilized closeness and betweenness centrality to better understand
the influence in the topology. Closeness, or information acquisition power in
this context, measures the ability of a PII attribute to retrieve information
from and send information to others. Those PII attributes with high value
can be viewed as ‘broadcaster’ or ‘gossiper’, which if breached, can put others
in danger. Betweenness, or criticality in this context, is based on the assump-
tion that a PII attribute may be exposing others if it presides over a path
bottleneck. It also identifies the boundary spanner, which separates differ-
ent communities and features. Those PII attributes with high value can be
viewed as ‘bridge’ or ‘broker’, if one connecting component is breached, those
can function as essential endpoints to protect the identity by not allowing
information to flow through.
Generally, previous studies indicate that centrality metrics are posi-
tively correlated [21] [15]. Overall degree and closeness were strongly inter-
correlated, while betweenness remained relatively uncorrelated with the other
measures [2]. Combinations of centrality values represent certain topology
and positional patterns ([7] p. 51). Given attributes with high degree and low
closeness centrality (information acquisition power), we can assert that the PII
is embedded in the cluster and far away from others, whereas low betweenness
(criticality) infers that the PII holds redundant links where information just
bypass it. Given attributes with a low degree and high closeness centrality
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(information acquisition power), the PII ties with substantial or active others,
whereas high betweenness (criticality) indicates that PII is spanning few links,
but with crucial influence on network flow. Low closeness (information acqui-
sition power) and high betweenness (criticality) combination results in specific
PII monopolizing the ties from a small number of PII attributes to many
others. We found a prime example of such situation with Signature. Low
betweenness (criticality) and high closeness (information acquisition power)
portray the PII locates in a dense, active cluster at the center of events with
many others. We summarize different combinations and their corresponding
characteristics in Table 4.1.
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Low Degree Low Closeness
(Information
Acquisition
Power)
Low
Betweenness
(Criticality)
High Degree - Embed in a
cluster which is
faraway from
others
PII with
redundant
connection - flow
bypass
High Closeness
(Information
Acquisition
Power)
Key PII
connected to
important and
active others
- Center PII
located in a
dense, active
cluster at the
center of events
with many
others
High
Betweenness
(Criticality)
PII’s few ties are
crucial to
network flow
PII monopolizes
the ties from a
small number of
PII to many
others
-
Table 4.1: Combinations of centrality metrics.
27
Chapter 5
Related Work
In this chapter, we cover previous research that studies and surveys
the statistics of identity theft. We can categorize previous work into three
main sources: Federal and State agencies, private organizations and academic
institutions.
From government sources, Federal and State agencies, studies by U.S.
department of Justice (Harrell [14]) release reports on distribution of identity
theft victims. Also United States General Accounting Office (USGAO [20]),
Federal Trade Commission (FTC [12]), Office of the Inspector General, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Postal Inspectors Office, and United States
Secret Service (USSS) present studies on identity theft from different domains.
Among private organizations, Javelin [16] publishes comprehensive anal-
ysis and case studies about fraud detection and identity threat.
In the academia, Copes et al. [6] analyzed reports from National Pub-
lic Survey on White Collar Crime and summarized financial-related fraudster
behavior such as credit card fraud and bank account fraud. Allison et al. [1]
gathered data from agencies. They performed statistics analysis on victims
and extracted demographic patterns of victims among the general U.S. popu-
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lation. Using Routine Activity Theory, Reyns [18] reported an empirical study
of identity theft in the United Kingdom. Pratt et al.[17], and Choo, [4] also
conducted studies utilizing Routine Activity Theory in different jurisdictions.
In these studies, statistic were presented. However, those data sets were
not fully constructed into a structured mathematical model and do not interact
with graph theoretic and social network analysis measures. We feed data sets
from ITAP and model the risk of exposure using Bayesian Network [25]. We
are also one of the first to develop identity ecosystem into graph network and
exploit the concept from three types of centrality as well as strongly connected
components.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we designed and implemented a visualization framework
that assists data providers and collectors to comprehend and analyze the prob-
abilistic graphical model of identity attributes. The visualization tool facili-
tates understanding of the whole risk model. Based on the Bayesian network
presentation of identity attributes, we developed traditional statistical charts
such as histograms, scatter plots, and pie charts based on values for each PII to
inspect the underlying distribution. Even though hundreds of PII constitute
the whole system, a large amount is indeed isolated. Only a small portion of
the PII is vulnerable to identity theft and one should make an effort to protect
them.
To investigate the structural topology and correlation between PII, we
further proposed to apply centrality measures such as degree, closeness, and
betweenness centrality. Moreover, we discussed the combination of all the
three centrality measures with high and low values. With these measures, we
can estimate the hidden characteristics of the network.
Lastly, we calculated Strongly Connected Components (SCC) to rec-
ognize clusters of PII that are mutually reachable among themselves. SCCs
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are subsets which are dangerous origins for breaches, can quickly jeopardize
other PII in the group and constraint the flow inside the sub-network. In the
current Identity Ecosystem, there is only one big cluster with 36 PII (5% of
the entire ecosystem) interconnected. We can again confirm that as complex
as the Identity Ecosystem is, a small portion is considered most threatening
and risky.
As the ITAP project continues to collect data, theories and technologies
developed from this research can be customized along the way to minimize our
identities’ risk of exposure and maximize privacy.
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